5.3 Dual currency linkage: the collaborative logic of closed-loop governance

LynkCoDAO's dual-currency model governance is not a simple superposition of "LNK-led + USO-assisted", but forms a collaborative closed loop through "cross-authority, interest binding, and risk sharing":

1. Cross-authority: Double endorsement of major decisions Decisions involving "system fundamentals" (such as modifying the dual-currency model itself, initiating cross-chain migration, and adjusting the treasury structure) require majority support from both LNK and USO holders：

Voting rights are redistributed according to "60% of LNK holders + 40% of USO holders", which not only reflects the core position of LNK, but also guarantees that the holders of stablecoins have the voice over；

If the single-group opposition rate exceeds 30%, the proposal automatically enters a "mediation period" (7 days), with a community-elected "arbitration committee" (50/50 LNK and USO holders) reconciling differences and avoiding governance deadlock.

1. Benefit Binding: Governance Bonus of Dual Coin Pledging Users who hold both LNK and USO and participate in the pledge can receive "collaborative rewards" in governance to encourage cross-group consensus:

The voting weight of the dual-coin pledger can be increased by 1.1 times (higher than the single-coin pledge), and it has the priority to withdraw in the distribution of the governance prize pool;

When dual-currency holders account for more than 30% of the total number of ecological users, the agreement automatically reduces the Rebase reward tax for dual-currency pledges (from 10% to 5%), further incentivizing the formation of "interest communities";

This design avoids the separation of "LNK holders only focus on price increases, USO holders only focus on stability", and promotes the community to form a "globally optimal" governance consensus.

1. Dynamic Balance: Self-regulation of the token ratio The protocol monitors the circulation ratio of LNK and USO through a governance mechanism to avoid excessive dominance of the ecosystem by a single token.

When the market value of LNK exceeds 70% (which may make the system overly dependent on its price fluctuations), the community can propose to "issue additional USO bonds" to encourage users to exchange USO and pledge to dilute the proportion of LNK;

When the USO liquidity exceeds 5 times the market value of LNK (which may reduce the capital efficiency of the system), it can be proposed to "increase the USO pledge income", guide some USO to be exchanged for LNK, and improve the utilization rate of funds;

The trigger threshold and specific measures for proportional adjustment are set by the joint voting of dual-currency holders to ensure that the adjustment direction is in line with the long-term interests of the ecosystem.